Hilbert’s "World Equations" and His Vision of a Unified Science by Majer, U. & Sauer, T.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
si
cs
/0
40
51
10
v1
  [
ph
ys
ic
s.
hi
st
-p
h]
  2
0 
M
ay
 2
00
4
Hilbert’s “World Equations” and His Vision of
a Unified Science∗
U. Majer†and T. Sauer‡
Abstract
In summer 1923, a year after his lectures on the ‘New Foundation
of Mathematics’ and half a year before the republication of his two
notes on the ‘Foundations of Physics,’ Hilbert delivered a trilogy of
lectures in Hamburg. In these lectures, Hilbert expounds in an un-
usually explicit manner his epistemological perspective on science as a
subdiscipline of an all embracing science of mathematics. The starting
point of Hilbert’s considerations is the claim that the class of grav-
itational and electromagnetic field equations implied by his original
variational formulation of 1915 provides valid candidate ‘world equa-
tions,’ even in view of attempts at unified field theories á la Weyl and
Eddington based on the concept of the affine connection. We give a
discussion of Hilbert’s lectures and, in particular, examine his claim
that Einstein in his 1923 papers on affine unified field theory only ar-
rived at Hilbert’s original 1915 theory. We also briefly comment on
Hilbert’s philosophical viewpoints expressed in these lectures.
1 Introduction
In the history of unified field theory, many contributors may be identified
[Goldstein and Ritter 2003, Goenner 2004], among them certainly, and per-
haps foremost, Einstein. Hilbert’s place in the history of the unified field
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theory program is also well recognized (see, e.g., the discussion of his work
in Vizgin’s study [Vizgin 1994]). But we tend to view the history of physics
in which Einstein was involved through that scholarship which has focussed
exclusively, or at least predominantly, on Einstein’s work as such. For the
case of Einstein’s “later journey,” we believe that many physicists as well as
historians would subscribe to Pais’s verdict that “his work on unification was
probably all in vain” [Pais 1982, p. 329]. The dismissal of Einstein’s efforts
over three decades is to some extent supported by Einstein’s own self-image,
in his later years, as the “lonesome outsider” working without real appreci-
ation in his golden Princeton cage. Einstein was an original thinker and an
influential voice in the debate, and for this reason understanding Einstein’s
obsession with the problem of a unified field theory over the last thirty years
of his life presents as much of a challenge to the historian as understanding
the achievements of his early work.
To this purpose, it helps to free one’s mind from preconceptions. We then
find Hilbert’s insights of great advantage since he was both knowledgeable
and had a well-founded and original perspective of his own.
Let us make a distinction right at the beginning in order to disentangle
different scientific approaches. The problem of a unified field theory, as of
the 1920s, can be seen in a more specific sense as the problem of finding a
consistent and satisfactory mathematical unification of the gravitational and
electromagnetic fields, be it by modified field equations, by a modification
of the space-time geometry, or by increasing the number of space-time di-
mensions. But there is another aspect to the problem that is, we believe, of
both historical and philosophical interest. This aspect concerns the way in
which contemporary scientists perceived the technical problem of unification
in the wider context of a unified corpus of human knowledge and under-
standing. In this respect, Hilbert’s perspective on the mathematical sciences
as an integrated whole can contribute to our modern attempts to come to
grips with the philosophical implications of an ever increasing specialization
in the natural sciences. Hilbert certainly was not the only one who envisaged
a unified science at the time. Many contemporary mathematicians shared
this concern. Felix Klein’s History of the Development of Mathematics in the
19th century [Klein 1979] can also be seen as a most interesting attempt to
understand the inner organic unity of the corpus of mathematical knowledge.
Other names that come to mind immediately are those of Kaluza and Weyl,
but the list certainly does not end here.
Einstein, too, shared this interest in understanding the inner unity of our
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knowledge of nature, and for him, too, the problem of finding a mathematical
representation that would provide a unification of the gravitational and elec-
tromagnetic fields was more than just a technical problem. This aspect of his
work is expressed most convincingly in Einstein’s own account of his lifelong
research concerns as given in his 1949 Autobiographical Notes [Einstein 1949].
Einstein, as we will argue, followed in his later work a path that is not at all
very different from Hilbert’s. Hilbert himself perceived Einstein as sharing
his concern. Of course, there are differences, which we do not deny. But from
a broader perspective, both Einstein and Hilbert – and others, one may add –
belong to a tradition which attempts to integrate our human knowledge and
to perceive an inner unity in science. For today’s philosophers, this tradition
seems to belong to the 18th and 19th century rather than to the 20th, or
to the 21st, for that matter. In this respect, Einstein and Hilbert are akin
more to the encyclopedists and enlightenment natural philosophers than to
modern puzzle solvers.
2 Hilbert’s Lectures on Fundamental Ques-
tions of Modern Physics of 1923
The document to which we would like to draw attention in this paper is
a manuscript extant in the Hilbert archives in Göttingen. It will be pub-
lished in one of the physics volumes of the Hilbert Edition under the title
“Fundamental Questions of Modern Physics.” It is a batch of roughly 100
manuscript pages with notes for a trilogy of lectures that Hilbert delivered
at the end of the summer semester of 1923 in Hamburg.1 The three lectures
focus on three different topics: the first deals with what Hilbert called the
“World Equations,” where these equations are introduced; the second part
1The lectures were held in Hamburg on July 26, 27, and 28, 1923. They were announced
under the title “Grundsätzliche Fragen der modernen Physik,” see “Hamburgische Uni-
versität. Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen. Sommersemester 1923,” Hamburg 1923, p. 41.
The third of the three lectures was delivered a second time, with short summaries of
the first two lectures, in a lecture held at the “Physikalische Gesellschaft” in Zürich on
October 27, 1923. This lecture was announced under the title “Erkenntnistheoretische
Grundfragen der Physik,” see “Neue Zürcher Zeitung,” Nr. 1473, Erstes Morgenblatt, 27
October, 1923. The manuscript Cod. Ms. Hilbert 596 in the Handschriftenabteilung at the
Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibiliothek (NSUB) contains the notes for both
the Hamburg and Zurich lectures. It will be cited in the following as Lectures.
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discusses applications and consequences of those equations; and the third
lecture contains a discussion of the old problem of theory and experience.
To Hilbert at that time, the epistemological and philosophical implica-
tions of recent developments in physics were of central concern. He himself
had contributed substantially to modern mathematical physics in the preced-
ing years, most notably through his two Communications to the Göttingen
Academy Proceedings on the Foundations of Physics of November 1915 and
December 1916, respectively [Hilbert 1915, Hilbert 1917]. By the summer
of 1917 at the latest, however, another problem was increasingly occupy-
ing Hilbert’s mind, namely the problem of an absolute consistency proof of
arithmetic that would provide a sound logical foundation for the whole body
of mathematics. Just as in Hilbert’s work in physics, the roots of this pre-
occupation date back to his very early work, at least to his “Mathematical
Problems” of 1900 [Hilbert 1900]. This interest resurfaced with a lecture on
set theory held in the summer term of 1917.
As a matter of fact, Hilbert’s renewed attention to the foundations of
mathematics in general, and to a theory of proof in particular, contributed
to his taking a broader perspective on the contemporary debates in General
Relativity and Field Theory. He had kept an active interest in the develop-
ment of General Relativity after 1915 but was increasingly concerned with
the philosophical implications of the new theories rather than with contribut-
ing solutions of some of its outstanding technical problems.2 He also began
to spend a great deal of energy in popularizing these new developments and
in acquainting a larger audience with the results of modern physics. It is
therefore no accident that when Hilbert spoke on the same topic a few weeks
later in Zurich, but in a single lecture, he chose to center on the third of
his Hamburg lectures.3 He used the same manuscript notes for the Zurich
2In this respect, we disagree with the claim made by Renn and Stachel, who characterize
Hilbert’s work in GRT as the transition from a “Theory of Everything to a Constituent
of General Relativity,” [Renn and Stachel 1999]. While their assessment may be true in
abstraction of its actors, it is certainly not true for Hilbert himself. Rather than beginning
to see his own work as a constituent of General Relativity, his main effort with respect
to General Relativity in later years was to emphasize his claim that his approach would
provide the basis for a true unification of physics.
3The lecture was arranged by Peter Debye following Hilbert’s request: “Prof. Hilbert
who is presently staying in Switzerland wished to deliver a lecture in the joint Physical
and Mathematical Colloquium.” (“Herr Prof. Hilbert, welcher zur Zeit in der Schweiz
weilt, hatte den Wunsch im zusammengefassten Physik. und Mathematischen Kolloquium
einen Vortrag zu halten.”) P. Debye to Robert Gnehm, 22 October 1923. Archiv des
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lecture, but since he had to cut down the material, he summarized the main
points of the first two lectures. This editing of his own manuscript makes
it difficult to exactly associate specific phrases with either the Hamburg or
Zurich lectures.
3 Hilbert’s “World Equations” of summer and
fall of 1923
Hilbert starts his first lecture by introducing what he calls the “World Equa-
tions” or the “World Laws” (“Weltgleichungen” or “Weltgesetze”). The way
Hilbert introduces these equations is interesting in itself but for the sake of
brevity, we shall only say that these equations basically are the same ones
that he had proposed in his First Communication on the Foundations of
Physics [Hilbert 1915], considering the fact that Hilbert had, originally, not
completely specified the Lagrangian I of the variational integral
∫
I
√
−gdτ, (1)
where g = det(gµν) and the integral is over (a domain of) four-dimensional
space-time. But both in 1915 and now again in 1923 he pointed out that the
fundamental dynamical variables are the ten components gµν of the metric
tensor and the four components ϕl of the electromagnetic potential.
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In his Hamburg and Zurich lectures, he takes the Lagrangian to be the
sum of a gravitational part K and a matter part L,
I = K + L. (2)
Schweizerischen Schulrats, ETH-Bibliothek, Zürich.
4As an aside, Hilbert observed in his 1923 lectures that the difference between his own
fundamental equations of November 1915 and Einstein’s gravitational field equations per-
tains to the choice of fundamental variables: “Einstein’s equations of gravitation are, in
the sense defined here, the fundamental equations of physics, if one takes in them the
gravitational potential gµν and the energy tensor as fundamental potentials. I proposed,
at the same time, fundamental equations of physics, in which only the electromagnetic
four-potential ϕk enters in addition to the gravitational potential gµν .” (“Die Einstein-
schen Gravitationsgl[eichungen] sind in dem hier definirten Sinne die Grundgl[eichungen]
der Physik, wenn man darin das Gravitationspotential gµν und ausserdem den Energieten-
sor als Grundpotentiale nimmt. Ich habe zurselben Zeit Grundgl[eichungen] der Physik
aufgestellt, in denen neben dem Gravitationspotential gµν nur noch das elektromagnetische
Viererpotential ϕk als Grundpotential auftritt.”) Lectures, part I, p. 16.
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The gravitational part K is understood to be the Riemann curvature scalar.
The matter part L is taken to be a sum of a term proportional to the square
of the fields, and another term proportional to the square of the potential,
L = αΦ+ βϕ, (3)
where Φ ≡
∑
ΦmnΦ
mn with Φmn ≡ ϕ[m;n]5 denoting the electromagnetic field,
and ϕ ≡ ϕkϕk.6 As usual, variation with respect to the components of the
metric tensor produces the gravitational field equations,
Kµν = −
∂
√−gL
∂gµν
, (4)
and variation with respect to the components of the electromagnetic four-
potential produces generalized Maxwell equations of the form
DivΦmn = β
α
ϕm. (5)
The latter equations are determined by the matter term alone. More specif-
ically, the first term in (3) produces the left hand side of the inhomogeneous
Maxwell equations, αDivΦmn, while the second term in (3) produces a term
proportional to the electromagnetic vector potential, ϕk, the latter acting
as the source of the inhomogeneous Maxwell equations. Following Mie’s
approach, external currents and charges are not part of the theory. The
homogeneous field equations,
Φ(mn;k) = 0, (6)
5We are closely following Hilbert’s and Einstein’s notation, with the following excep-
tions: for notational brevity, we denote partial (coordinate) derivatives by a subscript
index separated by a semicolon (comma), and indicate (anti)symmetrization by setting
the relevant indices in (square) brackets. We also do not use an imaginary x4-coordinate,
as Hilbert did.
6Already in his First Note on the Foundations of Physics [Hilbert 1915], Hilbert had
left open the final choice of a matter term in the Lagrangian. It should be diffeomorphism
invariant, and it should not depend on the derivatives of the metric. But Mie’s example
of a term proportional to the sixth power of ϕ had obviously been unacceptable, and a
different specification of the Lagrangian that would allow for solutions of a reasonable
physical interpretation had not yet been found, see [Mie 1912] and also the discussion
in Hilbert’s own lecture notes on “Die Grundlagen der Physik,” of the summer of 1916,
which are located at the library of the Mathematics Institute of Göttingen University,
see especially §§ 27–30. For further discussion of Hilbert’s First Communication, see
[Sauer 1999].
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follow, in the usual way, from the definition of the field and the fact that the
connection was assumed to be the symmetric Levi-Civita connection.
4 Hilbert’s Comments on Einstein’s Recent
Work on Affine Field Theory
At this point, Hilbert introduces a remark which at first sight may seem
preposterous, or, if you wish, arrogant and self-serving. He claims that Ein-
stein, in his most recent publications, would have arrived, after “a colossal
detour,” (“kolossaler Umweg”) at the very same results and equations that
Hilbert had put forward in his first note on the Foundation of Physics of
November 1915. But before dismissing this claim as a stubborn and senile
insistence of a mathematician who “has left reality behind” let us examine
his claim more closely and see whether it is conducive to a more nuanced
historical interpretation.
The starting point is Hilbert’s claim that the invariance of the action inte-
gral allows one to interpret the electromagnetic field equations as implicit in
the gravitational field equations. Hilbert here reiterates the claim of his first
note that this fact would provide the solution to a problem that he traces
back to Riemann, namely the problem of the connection between gravita-
tion and light. He goes on to observe that since then many investigators
had tried to arrive at a deeper understanding of this connection by merg-
ing the gravitational and electromagnetic potentials into a unity. The one
example Hilbert mentions explicitly is Weyl’s unification of the two fields
in a “unified world metric,” as he calls it, by means of Weyl’s notion of
gauge invariance. Another approach would be Eddington’s who proceeded
by selecting “certain invariant combinations” as fundamental potentials of
the quantities determining the fields. Schouten then had investigated the
manifold of possibilities of such combinations and realized that there would
be a rich variety of them. At this point, Hilbert inserts his comment on
Einstein’s recent work. He says explicitly:
Einstein finally ties up to Eddington in his most recent publica-
tions and, just as Weyl did, arrives at a system of very coherent
mathematical construction.
But, Hilbert goes on,
7
However, the final result of Einstein’s latest work amounts to
a Hamiltonian principle that is similar to the one that I had
originally proposed. Indeed, it might be the case that the content
of this latest Einsteinian theory is completely equivalent to the
theory originally advanced by myself.7
It is important to note that Hilbert makes his claim somewhat more specific
than that. Looking at the variational principle which he explicitly writes
down in the form
δ
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
{
K + αΦ+ βϕ
}√
−gdx1dx2dx3dx4 = 0, (7)
he observes that Einstein in his latest note had arrived at the very same
Hamiltonian principle
where ϕ is defined through ϕm = DivΦmn and variation with
respect to gµν and Φ
mn produces the eqs. Φmn = Rotϕm instead
of my eq. [(5)].
Hilbert concludes:
Hence, nothing else than an exchange of the two series [of] Max[well]
eq[uations].8
The emphasis in the last quote is Hilbert’s. He was not only pointing at
a vague similarity between his own work and Einstein’s. Rather he had
identified the differences in their work as being of a purely nominal nature.
5 Einstein’s “colossal detour”
In view of this remark, let us briefly examine Einstein’s post-1915 work in
General Relativity, in particular with regard to the problem of unifying grav-
itation and electromagnetism (see also [Vizgin 1994, Goenner 2004]).
7“Einstein endlich knüpft in seinen letzten Publikationen an Eddington an und gelangt
ebenso wie Weyl zu einem mathematisch sehr einheitlich aufgebauten System. Indess
mündet das Schlussresultat der letzten Einsteinschen Untersuchung wieder auf ein Hamil-
tonsches Prinzip, das dem ursprünglich von mir aufgestellten gleicht; ja es könnte sein,
dass diese Einsteinsche Theorie inhaltlich sich mit der von mir ursprünglich aufgestellten
Theorie völlig deckt.” Lectures, part I, p. 19 (Hilbert’s emphasis).
8“... wo ϕ durch ϕm = Div Φmn definiert ist und durch Variation nach gµν und Φ
mn die
Gl. Φmn = Rotϕm an Stelle meiner Gl. (5) entstehen. Also Nichts als eine Vertauschung
der beiden Serien [von] Max. Gl.” ibid., p.20 (Hilbert’s emphasis).
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Until 1923, it is perhaps not too unjust to say that Einstein basically had
been reacting to the work of others. He had submitted Kaluza’s theory of
a five-dimensional metric for publication in the Prussian Academy Proceed-
ings [Kaluza 1921] and had himself done calculations along this approach,
partly in collaboration with Jakob Grommer [Einstein and Grommer 1923].
He had also published a couple of notes that further elaborated on Weyl’s
ideas [Einstein 1921], notwithstanding his critical evaluation of its physi-
cal viability. Thirdly, he had lately picked up on Eddington’s approach
of basing the theory on the affine connection rather than on the metric
[Einstein 1923a, Einstein 1923b, Einstein 1923c].
In order to evaluate Hilbert’s claim, let us take a closer look at Einstein’s
work along Eddington’s approach, as he had published it in those papers of
1923 to which Hilbert refers. Following Eddington,9 Einstein had taken the
components of a real, symmetric affine connection Γκλµ as the basic quanti-
ties of the theory instead of the metric tensor field gµν which provided the
dynamical variables in the original theory. From the symmetric connection
he had constructed an asymmetric contracted curvature tensor,
Rkl = −Γαkl,α + ΓαkβΓβlα + Γαkα,l − ΓαklΓ
β
αβ. (8)
Since Rkldx
kdxl is an invariance of the line element, it was tempting to split
the Ricci tensor into a symmetric part gkl, to be interpreted as a metric tensor
associated with the gravitational field, and an antisymmetric part φkl, to be
associated with the electromagnetic field tensor.
In a first note presented to the Berlin Academy on 15 February 1923,
Einstein observed that Eddington had not yet solved the problem of finding
the necessary equations that would determine the 40 components of the con-
nection. He therefore set out to provide just such equations. He postulated
a Hamiltonian principle,
δ
{
∫
Hdτ
}
= 0, (9)
with a Lagrangian that would depend only on the contracted curvature ten-
sor, H = H(Rkl).10 More specifically, he proposed a tentative set of field
9In this paper, we will not deal with Eddington’s own work but only with Einstein’s
perception of it.
10We are using Einstein’s and Hilbert’s notation, both of whom referred to the La-
grangian as a Hamiltonian function.
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equations for the affine connection based on a Lagrangian proportional to
the square root of the determinant of the contracted curvature tensor
H = 2
√
−|Rkl|. (10)
In his first note, Einstein does not proceed to derive the field equations
explicitly from that Lagrangian. Instead, he does the variation for a general
Lagrangian H which gives him
skl;α −
1
2
δkαs
lσ
;σ −
1
2
δlαs
kσ
;σ −
1
2
δkαf
lσ
,σ −
1
2
δlαf
kσ
,σ = 0, (11)
where skl and fkl are defined as variations of H with respect to gkl and φkl,
respectively, i.e.
δH = sklδgkl + fklδφkl. (12)
Solving with respect to Γλµν , he obtains
Γαkl =
1
2
sαβ
(
skβ,l + sl,β,k − skl,β
)
− 1
2
skli
α +
1
6
δαk i
l +
1
6
δαl i
k, (13)
where il =
√
−|sklil = flσ,σ, and indices are raised and lowered by means of
skl and s
kl respectively, a fundamental tensor which in turn is defined via
skl = skl
√
−|skl| and sαisβi = δβα.
Explicit field equations were given by Einstein in a short follow up note
to his paper [Einstein 1923b] published on May 15, 1923. In it he briefly
recapitulated the basic equations of his previous note, implicitly introducing
a change of notation by denoting the Ricci tensor as rkl, and denoting the
Ricci tensor formed from the fundamental tensor skl only as Rkl. The field
equations were now given as the symmetric and antisymmetric parts of
rkl = Rkl +
1
6
[(
ik,l − il,k
)
+ ikil
]
. (14)
These field equations would not hold up for long. Already two weeks after
the publication of the second note, Einstein presented a third note to the
Prussian Academy dealing with the affine theory [Einstein 1923c], published
in the Academy’s Proceedings on 28 June. While Einstein in the introductory
paragraph of that paper announced that “further considerations” (“Weiteres
Nachdenken”) had led him to a “perfection” (“Vervollkommnung”) of the
10
theory laid out in the previous two notes, he was, in fact, going to present
some major revisions, including a new set of field equations.
One change in his understanding is reflected in an implicit overall change
of notation. While he had previously regarded the symmetric and antisym-
metric parts gkl and φkl of the Ricci tensor Rkl = Rkl(Γ
λ
µν) as the “metric
and electromagnetic field tensors,” he now attaches this physical meaning to
different quantities. Hence he now denotes the symmetric part of Rµν as γµν
and uses the letter g resp. g to denote the quantities that he had previously
denoted by s resp. s,
δH = gklδγkl + fklδφkl. (15)
It is the quantities gkl and fkl that were now “regarded as tensor densities
of the metric and electric field.” Einstein also pointed out that he no longer
would assume the Lagrangian H to depend on Rµν , i.e. only on the sum of
γµν + φµν but would now allow for the possibility that it depend on γµν and
φµν independently.
Thirdly, Einstein does not simply proceed to discuss restrictive conditions
or other motivations for a definite choice of H in order to fix the field equa-
tions. Instead, he argues that since, by assumption, eq. (15) is a complete
differential,
γµνdg
µν + φµνdf
µν (16)
is a complete differential of another scalar density H∗ where H∗ is a function
of the tensor densities of the metric and electric fields, H∗ = H∗(gµν , fµν). For
the choice of a definite H∗ Einstein then gives some arguments. It should be a
function of the two invariants of the electromagnetic fields, and specifically, he
argues that, “according to our present knowledge, the most natural ansatz”11
would be
H∗ = 2α√−g − β
2
fµνf
µν . (17)
The resulting field equations, after a rescaling of the electromagnetic field,
read
Rµν − αgµν = −
[(
− fµσfσν +
1
4
gµνfστf
στ
)
+
1
β
iµiν
]
(18)
−fµν =
1
β
i[µ,ν]. (19)
11“Der im Sinne unserer bisherigen Kenntnisse natürlichste Ansatz” [Einstein 1923c,
p. 139].
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For us, the last half-page of his note, following immediately after equations
(18), (19) is most interesting. Einstein observed that the field equations
derived along the lines sketched above may also be derived, in fact quite
easily, from a different Hamiltonian principle. He conceived ofH as a function
of gµν and fµν which Einstein, as was mentioned, in this third note took to be
the tensor densities of the metric and electromagnetic fields, H = H(gµν , fµν).
The Lagrangian whose variation with respect to gµν and fµν would produce
the field equations (18), (19) directly then reads
H = √−g
[
R− 2α+ κ
(1
2
fστf
στ − 1
β
iσi
σ
)]
. (20)
Here R denotes the Riemannian curvature scalar formed from the metric
tensor gµν . Notwithstanding the cosmological constant term −2α, the La-
grangian already looks familiar. But we need one more little step. In the
penultimate paragraph of his paper, Einstein suggests that for a physical
interpretation it would be most useful to introduce the “electromagnetic po-
tential”
−fµ =
1
β
iµ, (21)
a step that would eventually turn the field equations into those that were
identical - up to the sign of the constant β - to field equations proposed by
Weyl.
Let us now pause and look at Einstein’s result through Hilbert’s eyes. If
we substitute the electromagnetic potential (21) for iµ, we get the variational
principle in the form
δH = δ
∫
{
R− 2α + κ
(1
2
fστf
στ − βfσfσ
)
}√
−gdτ = 0. (22)
Comparing this variational principle with the variational integral (7) given
by Hilbert in his lectures, we see that Hilbert’s interpretation actually does
capture Einstein’s result of his third note on the affine theory, provided we
make the following identifications. Hilbert’s K would be Einstein’s R − 2α,
i.e. Hilbert ignored the cosmological term. However, such a term would
fit easily into Hilbert’s original scheme. We would also identify Hilbert’s
αΦ with Einstein’s κ
2
fστf
στ . Finally, we would identify Hilbert’s βϕ with
Einstein’s κβfσf
σ.
One technical difference remains. Hilbert is doing the variation with
respect to the electromagnetic potential ϕµ whereas Einstein is doing the
12
variation with respect to the electromagnetic tensor density fµν . In Hilbert’s
theory, the electromagnetic field was defined as Φmn ≡ ϕ[m;n] and the vari-
ation produced the generalized Maxwell equations (5). In Einstein’s theory,
the variation is done with respect to the field fµν . The variation of the term
βfσf
σ makes use of the definition fµ = −(1/β)fµν;ν and produces the relation
fµν = f[µ;ν] as an electromagnetic field equation. Taking into account that for
symmetric connections the homogeneous Maxwell equations (6) follow from
the fields being given as the rotation of a vector, we can now see the point
of Hilbert’s remark.
Regardless of how Einstein had derived his field equations in the first
place, he himself had cast them into a form that was technically equivalent
to Hilbert’s initial framework of 1915. The resulting equations were essen-
tially equivalent to Hilbert’s with the only difference that what appeared as a
definition and a field equation in one framework turned out to be the result-
ing field equations and the defining relation in the other. In Hilbert’s words,
the difference amounted to an “interchange of the two series of Maxwell equa-
tions.” To be sure, the identification involves some amount of interpretation
but essentially we can see why Hilbert rejoiced:
And if on a colossal detour via Levi-Civita, Weyl, Schouten, Ed-
dington, Einstein returns to this result, then this certainly pro-
vides a beautiful confirmation.12
It also becomes conceivable that Hilbert’s reprint of his 1915 and 1917 notes
on the Grundlagen der Physik in 1924 as a single paper in the Mathematische
Annalen was not motivated by his desire to revise his original theory (as has
been argued in [Renn and Stachel 1999]). His lectures of 1923 in Hamburg
and Zurich rather suggest that the true motivation for Hilbert becomes visible
on the background of his perception of Einstein’s latest work on the affine
theory. He saw Einstein’s work as a confirmation of his original approach.
Hence, there is no reason to assume that Hilbert did not believe what he
wrote about his original 1915 theory in the new introduction to the 1924
reprint:
I firmly believe that the theory which I develop here contains a
core that will remain and that it creates a framework that leaves
12“Und wenn auf dem kollossalen Umweg über Levi Civita, Weyl, Schouten, Eddington
Einst. zu dem Resultat zurückgelangt, so liegt darin sicher eine schöne Gewähr.” Lectures,
part I, p. 20.
13
enough room for the future construction of physics along the field
theoretic ideal of unity.13
6 Accessorial Laws of Nature?
As we have seen, Hilbert meant what he said, even though he was deliberately
formulating his claim as a hypothesis. Having established that his “world
equations” are confirmed, if only by his own perception of a convergence
of related research efforts, Hilbert in his second lecture became somewhat
more speculative. Of central importance for the argument of his second
lecture is the notion of “accessorial laws.”14 While Hilbert does use the
term “accessorial” in a contemporary lecture course,15 we are not aware of
any other usage of the term, neither in Hilbert’s own Oeuvre nor in any of
his contemporaries’ writings. Our guess is that Hilbert created a neologism
based on the Latin “accedere” — in its meaning “to add.”16 What notion
then does Hilbert want to capture by the term “accessorial”? He says:
Anything that needs to be added to the world equations in order
to understand the events (“Geschehnisse”) of inanimate nature,
I will briefly call “accessorial.”17
An obvious candidate for something “accessorial” with respect to the “world
equations” immediately comes to mind. These equations being differential
equations, require for the explanation of “events” certainly the determina-
tion of initial or boundary conditions. Indeed, Hilbert concedes that initial
or boundary conditions are necessary in order to allow for definite solutions
13“Ich glaube sicher, daß die hier von mir entwickelte Theorie einen bleibenden Kern
enthält und einen Rahmen schafft, innerhalb dessen für den künftigen Aufbau der
Physik im Sinne eines feldtheoretischen Einheitsideals genügender Spielraum da ist.”
[Hilbert 1924, p. 2].
14For another discussion of this concept, see [Majer and Sauer 2003].
15See lecture notes for course on “Über die Einheit in der Naturerkenntnis,” held in
winter 1923/24. NSUB Cod. Ms. Hilbert 568, p. 247.
16We realize that the English word “accessorial” is not a neologism and its meaning of
auxiliary, supplementary makes good sense in the present context.
17“Ich möchte Alles, was noch zu den Weltgleichungen hinzugefügt werden muss, um
die Geschehnisse in der leblosen Natur zu verstehen, kurz accessorisch nennen.” Lectures,
part II, p. 1.
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of the “world equation,”18 but, obviously he has something more demand-
ing than “initial conditions” in mind, because he does not qualify them as
“accessorial.” Hence, the question arises, what else does he want to capture
with the term “accessorial.” To answer this question, we have to explain how
he proceeds in the second lecture.
Conceding that the world equations are in need of initial or boundary
conditions, the main point of Hilbert’s second Hamburg lecture is to argue
for another and non-trivial meaning of “accessorial.” Even with initial con-
ditions, the equations, being differential equations with respect to some time
coordinate, would only predict the future from the past, but would they also
teach us something about the present which after all, as Hilbert argues, is
what we really want? If the answer is no, then we are in need of “accessorial”
laws, that can tell us something about the present state of nature. Now the
interesting point is, as we will see in a moment, that Hilbert argues that
no such accessorial laws of nature exist, for the simple reason that precisely
that which we want to capture with such laws is either inconsistent with the
world equations or already contained in them.
A first argument supporting his claim is a discussion of the irreversibility
of thermodynamics. He looks at the example of the mixing of a gas that is
initially distributed over two separate halves of a container and emphasizes
that the apparent asymmetry with respect to past and future is exclusively a
consequence of the choice of the initial states and the initial conditions, and
hence that the irreversibility is not one that exists objectively in inanimate
nature and its lawfulness but is only an apparent irreversibility, arising from
what he called our anthropomorphic point of view.
The argument is interesting in itself, especially with respect to Hilbert’s
epistemological position.19 While Hilbert is unambiguous about his claim
that there are no accessorial laws introduced in statistical mechanics, he
himself brings up an obvious objection. The example of the diffusion of a gas
in a container in the theoretical context of kinetic gas theory presupposes
the assumption that there exist atoms and molecules, and that these are the
fundamental constituents of the diffusing gas. This argument leads him to a
18For further discussion Hilbert would assume the world to be Euclidean-Newtonian at
infinity, but with respect to contemporary cosmological debates Hilbert added a disclaimer
to the effect that this choice was only motivated by formal simplicity and was made only
to fix the ideas.
19For a more detailed discussion of the non-objective but anthropomorphic character of
certain apparently irreversible processes in inanimate nature, see [Majer 2002].
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discussion of the question whether the principle of atomism is an accessorial
law of nature. Hilbert’s position on this issue is just as unambiguous as is his
position on the issue of irreversibility. He argues that the world equations,
possibly after necessary elaborations or corrections, suffice to explain the ex-
istence, and even the structure, and properties, of matter. In order to justify
this claim, Hilbert refers to Bohr’s quantum theory and to the explanation
of basic features of the periodic system of elements (such as its periodicity
and the chemical stability of the inert gases) on the grounds of the electron
orbit model.
Hilbert’s conclusion from this discussion is that the field equations and
laws of motion suffice to derive the deepest properties of matter including
the characteristic details of the chemical elements as particular mathematical
integrations of the field equations. It is important to note that in this respect
the “world equations” differ fundamentally from Newton’s laws, including
gravity, because the latter do not imply anything about the existence of
atoms and molecules. Of course, Hilbert would take it for granted, among
other things, that particle-like solutions of the field equations would exist
whose dynamics would then be governed by the field equations as well, rather
than by independent equations of motion.
Hilbert’s belief that the world equations can tell us something about the
present presupposes that we accept only those solutions to the equations
that correspond to constant or periodic processes in nature. Hence we have
to qualify the assertion about the non-existence of accessorial laws by ad-
mitting that there are accessorial ideas and principles, such as stability and
periodicity. But the crucial difference, according to Hilbert, is that these
accessorial ideas and principles do not have the character of new equations
but are of a more general nature that is connected to our thinking as such
and to our attitude towards nature.
It so happened that a number of the assumptions made by Hilbert, both
explicitly and implicitly, turned out to be highly problematic, if not false.
This is the case, e.g, with the violation of gauge invariance implied by ac-
cepting an explicit dependence of the Lagrangian on the electromagnetic po-
tential. But before dismissing Hilbert as a bad speculative physicist, let us
take seriously the fact that he himself in a most enthusiastic manner pointed
to the rapid development of the natural sciences and the rapid succession of
fundamental discoveries. It seems to us that his perhaps premature accep-
tance of results which had yet to be confirmed appears to us today näıve for
a very specific reason. Hilbert’s optimism was fuelled by his unwillingness
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to accept the fact that the modern development of the natural sciences no
longer allows for a conceptual unity of knowledge. In this respect, by the
way, he was not alone. Indeed, the purpose of the first two lectures of his
trilogy was to provide the scientific underpinning for a more philosophical
claim that he made in the third lecture.
7 Hilbert’s Position between Kantian Apri-
orism and Poincaré’s Conventionalism
Let us therefore return now to Hilbert’s epistemological position.20 In his
third lecture, Hilbert addresses the ancient question as to the sources of our
knowledge, or, in his own words:
We are dealing here with a decision of an important philosophical
problem, namely the old question as to the portion of our knowl-
edge that comes from our thinking, on the one hand, and from
experience, on the other hand.21
In the remainder of this paper we want to say a few words about Hilbert’s
answer to the question of the borderline between knowledge a priori and
knowledge by experience. Hilbert’s position is based on two fundamental
presuppositions. The first of these is the distinction between two different
domains of the natural sciences, the domain of “inanimate” nature, which is
the proper domain of physics in the widest sense, and the domain of living
beings including “man as such” which is the domain of biology, including the
social and cultural sciences. Even though the distinction seems problematic
from a physicalistic point of view, it has not been shown to this day whether
the laws of physics, as we know them today, suffice to deduce the phenomena
of life, or whether we need in fact some accessorial laws or principles.22 But
for our context, it is sufficient to take this distinction as a warning that the
claim that there exist “world equations” in the strong sense, i.e. that we do
20See [Majer and Sauer 2003] for a more extensive discussion.
21“Wir stehen da vor der Entscheidung über ein wichtiges philosophisches Problem,
nämlich vor der alten Frage nach dem Anteil, den das Denken einerseits und die Erfahrung
andererseits an unserer Erkenntnis haben.” Lectures, part III, p. 1.
22For a discussion of this intricate question in connection with the supposed irreversibil-
ity of living processes, see [Majer 2002].
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not need any accessorial laws, is certainly more difficult to establish if the
life sciences were included in the claim.
The second fundamental distinction that plays a role here is a distinction
between three different levels of experience: (i) a level of every day experience,
(ii) a level of scientific experience in the broadest sense of the term, and (iii)
a level of totally objective knowledge that is achieved by an emancipation
from what Hilbert calls our anthropomorphic point of view. The principle of
objectivity that Hilbert had introduced earlier in his first lecture illustrates
what Hilbert has in mind by the emancipation from the anthropomorphic
point. This principle states
A sentence about nature, expressed in coordinates, is only then
a proposition about the objects in nature, if the sentence has a
content which is independent of the coordinates.23
According to Hilbert, this emancipation from the coordinate system can be
achieved in three different ways that correspond to the three forms of singular,
particular, and general judgment: First, by showing or presenting a concrete
object, in respect to which the coordinate system has to be fixed; second,
in the form of an existential assertion by saying: there exists a coordinate
system in which all the formulated relations between the objects considered
are valid; third, by formulating the proposition in a form that is valid in every
coordinate system. Evidently, this distinction implies that the introduction of
coordinates in the first place is a compromise to our human way of looking at
nature, and the third way of emancipating from a coordinate system therefore
represents the most far-reaching “emancipation from the anthropomorphic
point of view.” A certain view of the actual and proper development of
science is implicit in this latter assumption, and Hilbert’s epistemology is
indeed a philosophy of graded progress [Majer and Sauer 2003].
Hilbert emphatically points out that the Kantian question is ripe for an
answer for two reasons, (1) the spectacular progress in the sciences of the
time and (2) the advent of the axiomatic method. Much more needs to be
said about Hilbert’s epistemological position in general and the interrelations
of these two moments in particular. But for the sake of brevity, let us here
only point to the role of the world equations. Hilbert says:
23“Ein in Koordinaten ausgedrückter Satz über die Natur ist nur dann eine Aussage
über die Gegenstände in der Natur wenn er von den Koordinaten unabhängig einen Inhalt
hat.” Lectures, part I, p. 3.
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If now these world equations, and with them the framework of
concepts, would be complete, and we would know that it fits in
its totality with reality, then in fact one needs only thinking and
conceptual deduction in order to acquire all physical knowledge.24
Leaving aside the difficult question concerning completeness of physical the-
ories, we only wish to emphasize that Hilbert, contrary to what one might
expect from this quote, by no means wants to take an idealistic position. He
emphasizes
I claim that precisely the world equations can be obtained in no
other way than from experience. It may be that in the construc-
tion of the framework of physical concepts manifold speculative
view points play a role; but whether the proposed axioms and the
logical framework erected from them is valid, experience alone can
decide this question.25
In the sequel to the lecture, Hilbert refined this somewhat crude position
by taking issue with Kantian apriorism and with Poincaré’s conventionalism.
The upshot is
The opinion advocated by us rejects the absolute Apriorism and
the Conventionalism; but nevertheless it does in no way retreat
from the question of the precise validity of the laws of nature. I
will instead answer this question in the affirmative in the following
sense. The individual laws of nature are constituent parts of the
total conceptual framework, set up axiomatically from the world-
equations. The world-equations are the precipitation of a long,
in part very strenuous, experimental inquiry and of experience,
often delayed by going astray. In this way we come to the idea
24“Wenn nun diese Weltgleichungen und damit das Fachwerk vollständig vorläge, und
wir wüssten, dass es auf die Wirklichkeit in ihrer Gesamtheit passt und dann bedarf es
tatsächlich nur des Denkens d.h. der begrifflichen Deduktion, um alles phys. Wissen zu
gewinnen.” Lectures, part III, pp. 20f. (Hilbert’s emphasis).
25“... behaupte ich, dass gerade die Weltgesetze auf keine andereWeise zu gewinnen sind,
als aus der Erahrung. Mögen bei der Konstruktion des Fachwerkes der phys. [Begriffe]
mannigfache spekulative Gesichtspunkte mitwirken: ob die aufgestellten Axiome und das
aus ihnen aufgebaute logische Fachwerk stimmt, das zu entscheiden, ist allein die Erfahrung
im Stande.” ibid., p. 21 (Hilbert’s emphasis).
19
that we approximate asymptotically a Definitivum by continued
elaboration and completion of the world-equations.26
Whatever may be said about this position from a historical and philosoph-
ical standpoint, we hope to have at least shown that Hilbert’s work along
the unified field theory program is embedded in a broader perspective of
epistemological and methodological concerns that well deserves to be taken
seriously, even on today’s philosophical horizon.
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(Handschriftenabteilung).
References
[Einstein 1921] Einstein, Albert. “Über eine naheliegende Ergänzung
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